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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-INDIAN TRIBES-INDAN MINING LEASING ACT OF

1938-TAxATION-RESTITUTION-The

United States Supreme Court

held that an Indian tribe could not recover state taxes paid by its

mineral lessee when the taxes were found to be in violation of
federal law and the lessee had waived its right to a tax refund.
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. 1650 (1998).
The Crow Tribe ("Tribe") ceded a portion of its non-reservation
land to the United States in 1904.1 Although the United States
conveyed the surface rights of the strip to various non-Indians, the
United States continued to hold the mineral rights underlying the
strip in trust for the Tribe.2 The Tribe entered into a coal mining
lease agreement with Westmoreland Resources, Inc.
3
("Westmoreland"), in 1972 for a portion of the "ceded strip";
Westmoreland subsequently contracted with four of its utility
company customers to pass on the cost of any taxes to these
4
customers.
In July of 1975, the state of Montana imposed a tax scheme on
all Montana-produced coal; the scheme consisted of both a
severance and a gross proceeds tax.5 As applied to the "ceded
strip," the state severance tax was thirty percent of the sales price
of any coal contracts and the county gross proceeds tax was five
percent of the sales price of the coal contracts.6 Westmoreland paid
the taxes without pursuing available state law remedies for protests
or refunds 7 and later entered into a corresponding settlement
1. Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct 1650, 1653 (1998). The 1,137,500 acre
tract was ceded for occupation by early settlers. Id.
2. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1653.
3. Id. at 1654. The lease was executed with approval of the Department of the Interior
and pursuant to the Indian Mining Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1938). Id.
4. Id. at 1653. The State and Big Horn, Treasure, and Yellowstone Counties have the
authority to tax, and the responsibility for providing public services on, the "ceded strip." Id.
5. Id. at 1654. A severance tax is a form of property taxation in which a tax is levied
on minerals at the time they are removed from the earth. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 958 (6th
ed. 1991). A gross proceeds tax is levied upon the total receipts of income without allowing
a deduction for expenses. Id. at 485.
6. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1654. The severance tax was subsequently
reduced to 15% of the sales price. Id. at 1654.
7. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1654. Westmoreland paid $46.8 million in state
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agreement with the state of Montana.8

In January 1976 and in January 1982, the Tribe attempted to
.impose a severance tax on coal mined on its reservations, including
the "ceded strip," but both times the United States Department of
the Interior disapproved the tax as applied to the Montana "ceded
strip."9 The Tribe did not appeal the disapproval of the tax in either
instance. 10
In 1978, the Tribe fied a federal action against Montana in which
it sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the state's taxes on
Tribe coal. 1 The United States District Court for the District of
Montana dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding that the Tribe's petition did state a cause of action
that, if proven, would show that the state tax was federally
preempted by the Indian Mining Leasing Act of 1938 ("IMLA of
1938") and illegally interfered with the sovereignty of the Tribe
(Crow

).13

Following the Crow I decision, the Tribe and Westmoreland
revised their lease agreement, with Department of Interior

approval, to include a section providing that Westmoreland would
pay the Tribe a tax equal to the state's taxes, less any taxes
Westmoreland was required to pay the state. 14 In December of 1983,
the United States District Court for the District of Montana granted
a joint motion by the Tribe and Westmoreland to pay the severance
tax into the district court registry during the pendency of the
proceedings challenging Montana's authority to tax the "ceded
severance taxes from 1975 to 1982, and $11.4 million in county gross proceeds taxes from
1975 to 1987. Id.
8. Id. at 1654. Westmoreland agreed to waive any right to a tax refund from the state
of Montana. Id.
9. Id. at 1654-55. The Tribe's Constitution required Department of Interior approval of
taxes adopted by the Tribe; the Department approved the tax, as applied to the reservation,
but not as to the non-reservation "ceded strip." Id. at 1654-55.
10. Id. at 1655. The Tribe did attempt to amend its constitution to extend its tax to the
'ceded strip," but the Department of Interior disapproved the proposed amendment on
procedural grounds. Id. at 1655.
11. Id.
12. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1655; Crow Tribe v. Montana, 469 E Supp. 154
(D. Mont. 1979).
13. Id.; Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F 2d 1104, 1113-17 (9th Cir. 1981),
amended 665 F 2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (Crow 1).
14. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1655. This agreement permitted the Tribe to
have in place a tax under which it could claim future tax payments Westmoreland might
make into the district court registry in the event that the Tribe prevailed in its litigation
against Montana- Id.
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strip."15 In November of 1987, the district court granted a similar
motion for the gross proceeds tax, allowing that tax to be paid into
the district court registry as well.' 6
After a January 1984 trial,17 the district court held that the state's
taxes on the "ceded strip" were not federally preempted.'8 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state taxes were both
federally preempted by the IMLA of 1938 and void as in
contravention of tribal self-government (Crow II).' 9 The United
States Supreme Court summarily affirmed,20 and, as a result, the
district court ordered the funds in its registry released to the
21
United States, as trustee for the Tribe.
The Tribe and the United States filed complaints against Montana
and Big Horn County seeking to recover state and county taxes
that were paid by Westmoreland before entry of the District Court
orders of 1983 and 1987 providing payment of the taxes into the
District Court registry.22 The petitioners based their complaint on
theories of assumpsit and constructive trust and alleged that equity
required the state and county to disburse to the Tribe, with
15. Id. at 1655. After January 1983, Westmoreland paid the state severance tax into the
district court registry. Id.
16. Id. AfterNovember 1987, Westmoreland paid the county gross proceeds tax into
the registry. Id.
17. Id at 1656. The United States intervened on the Tribe's behalf to represent its
interest as trustee of the Tribe coal. Id.
18. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1656. The district court found that neither the
language of the Indian Commerce Clause nor the IMLA of 1938 expressly prohibited the state
of Montana from imposing a tax on the non-Indian lessee's production of Tribe coal held in
trust by the United States. Crow Tribe v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont. 1985).
19. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1656. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the IMLA of
1938 so as to have a "broad preemptive effect" upon state taxation upon Tribal resources.
Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F. 2d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 1987) (Crow II). The Ninth Circuit also
discussed the IMLA of 1938's purpose of revitalizing tribal governments and promoting tribal
development and found that the Montana tax interfered with tribal economic interests. Id. at
898-99.
20. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1656; Crow Tribe v. Montana, 108 S.Ct 685
(1988). The Court explained the effect of a judgment it summarily affirms in Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1568 n.5 (1983). "A summary disposition affirms only the
judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to
sustain that judgment." Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1660; Anderson, 103 S.Ct. at 1568,
n. 5.
21. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1656. Although the district court granted the
Tribe's motion to release the registry funds for the benefit of the Tribe, Westmoreland had
initially objected, claiming the funds as its own because the taxes had been preempted and
the Tribe had no valid tax in place during the fund deposit years. Id. at 1656. The district
court rejected Westmoreland's claim, finding that the Tribe-Westmoreland lease controlled,
establishing the registry funds as properly payable to the Tribe. Id.
22. Id. at 1656.
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interest, the taxes collected from Westmoreland in violation of
federal law. 23 Montana filed a motion for summary judgment,
alleging that any right to a refund had accrued to Westmoreland,
and not to either the Tribe or the United States. 24 In December
1990, the district court denied the summary judgment motion,
finding that a full hearing was necessary.25 The district court then
certified for interlocutory appeal the issue of whether summary
judgment was improperly denied. 26 In 1991, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted permission to make the
interlocutory appeal but, in 1992, dismissed the appeal as

improperly allowed (Crow

111).21

Following a trial in April and May of 1994, the district court
denied the disgorgement relief sought by the Tribe. 28 The Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that the district court had abused its
discretion in not granting the relief requested. 29 The case was then
remanded to the district court for entry of the disgorgement.30
Montana appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
23. Id. The Tribe did not request, in the alternative, damages for its actual financial
losses allegedly caused by the State's taxes. Id. at 1657. An action of assumpsit for money
had and received is a cause of action that lies when one party has received money, which in
equity ought to have been paid to another party. BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1991). A
constructive trust is a trust created by operation of law against a party, who, by fraud,
duress, commission of wrong, or by another form of unconscionable conduct, has obtained
legal right to property that he should not, in equity, enjoy. Id. at 218.
24. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1657.
25. Id. The District Court found that a decision as to the restitution issue raised by the
Tribe and the United States could not be decided on a summary judgment motion, without
the opportunity for all parties to clarify their positions. Id.
26. Id. The issue was certified, upon Montana's application, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). Id.
27. Id.; Crow Tribe v. Montana, 969 F2d 848 (9th Cir. 1992) (Crow III). The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the issue of whether the Tribe and United States had
a right to a refund for the taxes paid by Westmoreland had previously been decided in Crow
II. Id.
28. Id. at 1657. The district court found that the state was not unjustly enriched at the
detriment of the Tribe based on the Westmoreland coal taxes paid to the state. Id.
29. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1659. The Court of Appeals did recognize the
lack of presence of the traditional elements of assumpsit or constructive trust in the case.
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 92 F 3d 826, 828, (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 98 F 3d 1194
(9 th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). However, the Ninth Circuit stated that its prior holdings in
Crow If and III established that the presence of these traditional elements were not
necessary for the Tribe to prevail. Id. at 828. The Ninth Circuit found that equity required
restitution of the wrongfully collected taxes to the Tribe, which was harmed as a result of
the unjust enrichment of the state through the payment of such taxes. Id. at 830.
30. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1659. The district court was to also consider
the Tribe's request for prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. Id., cited in, Crow Tribe of
Indians, 92 F 3d at 830-31.
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certiorari (Crow IV).31 The question before the Supreme Court was
whether the Tribe could recover taxes paid by its mineral lessee
when those taxes had been subsequently found to be in violation of
federal law and when the lessee, itself, had waived its claim to a
32
tax refund.
Before analyzing the parties' arguments, Justice Ginsburg, writing
for the Court, noted that Westmoreland had waived its claim for a
tax refund from the state.3 3 The Court then stated the general rule
that a nontaxpayer may not sue for a refund of taxes paid by
another.3 Furthermore, the Court clarified the impact of Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico on Crow II, noting that the case
indicated that Montana had the power to tax Tribe coal, but not at
35
an excessive or discriminatory rate.
Initially, the Court considered the Tribe's argument that the Tribe,
and not Montana, was the proper recipient of Westmoreland's tax
payments and that, accordingly, the disgorgement remedy was
appropriate. 36 The Tribe relied on Valley County v. Thomas, in
which a refund to the proper taxing authority of license fees paid
to the wrong political subdivision was justified.3 The Court
distinguished Crow IV from Valley County on the basis that in
Crow IV, under Cotton Petroleum, both entities had actual
authority to tax the coal. 38 In addition, the Court commented that
the Tribe could not have collected taxes from Westmoreland during
the relevant period because the Department of the Interior had not
9
approved the Tribe's tax.3
31. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 14, 1997.
Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. 294 (1997).
32. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct at 1659.
33. Id. at 1654, 1659.
34. Id. at 1659; See generally, United States v. California, 113 S.Ct. 1784, 1788 (1993).
35. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1660. In Cotton Petroleum, 109 S.Ct. 1698
(1989), the Supreme Court held that the IMLA did not preempt a New Mexico oil production
tax on Cotton Petroleum, a non-Indian oil lessee. Id. at 1712-13.
36. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1660.
37. Id. In Valley County, 97 P.2d 435 (Mont. 1939), was at issue a Montana law
establishing that motor vehicles be licensed by the county in which the vehicle was owned
and taxable. Id. at 349. In that case, Valley County sued McCone County, claiming that it was
unlawfully collecting fees and issuing licenses for vehicles taxable in Valley County. Id. The
Montana Supreme Court held that Valley County could recover the unlawfully collected fees
from McCone County. Id. at 366.
38. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1661. Under Cotton Petroleum, the state was
merely prohibited from taxing Tribe coal at an excessive or discriminatory rate. Id.; Cotton
Petroleum, 109 S.Ct. at 1714.
39. Id.. Although the district court had determined in 1988 that the Department of
Interior's refusal to approve the Tribe's proposed tax was in error, the district court also
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The Court next considered the Tribe's alternative argument that
tax disgorgement was appropriate because the state taxes had an
adverse impact on the marketability of the Tribe's coal. 40 The Tribe
claimed that the state taxes on its coal wrongfully deprived the
Tribe of the economic rental value of the coal. 41 The Court noted
that the Tribe did not ask for actual damages based on losses
suffered but, instead, sought disgorgement of the state taxes paid
by Westmoreland to compensate the Tribe for the alleged adverse

impact of the tax.42

After reviewing both Tribe arguments, the Supreme Court found
that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying the
disgorgement remedy sought and held that the Tribe was riot
entitled to disgorgement of taxes improperly assessed against its
mineral lessee (Crow IV).3 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
the proper amount of the preregistry taxes to be kept by Montana
in consideration of the receipt by the Tribe of all registry funds.4
Justices Souter and O'Connor concurred in the decision of the
Court in so far as it reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for
further proceedings. 45 Justices Souter and O'Connor dissented,
however, from the limits they believe the Court expressly or
impliedly placed on the district court in its determination of the
proper amount of preregistry taxes to be retained by Montana.4 By
instructing the district court to consider the many millions of
dollars the Tribe had already received, the minority opined that the
majority effectively prevented the district court from awarding the
Tribe any appropriate restitution it may have been owed in
recognition of excess taxes collected by Montana during the
preregistry period. 47 The minority also disagreed with the Court's
found that the state taxes did not cause the error. Id. at 1658. The court stated that the
Department of the Interior's erroneous conclusion that the Tribe.lacked authority to tax the
Westmoreland coal was not in reliance on or in consideration of the Montana taxes. Id.
40. Id. at 1661.
41. Id. The Tribe did not assert that any sales or coal contracts were lost by
Westmoreland due to high prices resulting from the Montana tax. Id.
42. Id. at 1661-62. The district court properly did not consider an award of actual
damages because the complaint did not request such relief. Id.
43. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1662.
44. Id. The Court, in its remand order, stated it did not "foreclose the District Court
from any course the Federal Rules and that court's thorough grasp on this litigation lead it to
take." Id.
45. Id. at 1663. (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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attempt to distinguish Crow IV from Vally County and would have
instead applied VaUey County.4 The minority believed that Valley
County was controlling in this situation in which two rival taxing
authorities sought to impose taxes on the Tribe's mineral lessee
when the Tribe was clearly entitled to impose its own tax but
received nothing, and the State, entitled to no excess taxes,
received and the kept the money.49 The minority would have
remanded to the district court without restricting the amount of
restitution, if any, the Tribe was owed for excess taxes paid in the
preregistry period.w°
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally, shown great
deference to the sovereignty of the Indian tribes and, consequently,
has shown reluctance to allow state taxation on Indian activities,
absent express Congressional authorization to the contrary.51 In
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the United States
Supreme Court initially considered the limitation, if any, on a
state's authority to tax commercial activity performed by
non-Indians on an Indian reservation. 52 The state of Arizona sought
to impose its motor carrier license and use taxes on Pinetop
Logging Co. ("Pinetop"), a non-Indian commercial entity that felled,
cut, and transported trees for the White Mountain Apache Tribe
("Apache") pursuant to a contract with Fort Apache Timber Co.
("FATCO").5 Pinetop paid the taxes under protest and brought suit
with the Apache in state court, alleging that the taxes were
preempted by federal law or, in the alternative, unlawfully
interfered with tribal self-government.M
The Bracker Court acknowledged the traditional deference given
to tribal sovereignty in its statement that state taxation authority
48. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1664.
49. Id. The minority emphasized the fact that the Tribe could have rightfully imposed a
coal tax at all relevant times because the Department of Interior wrongfully disapproved the
tax. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
50. Id. at 1665.
51. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 100 S.Ct. 2578 (1980); Moe v. Salish &
Tootenai Tribes, 96 S.Ct. 1634 (1976); United States v. Kagama, 6 S.Ct. 1109 (1886).
52. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 100 S.Ct at 2580. The Supreme Court has long
recognized the sovereignty of Indian tribes over their members and territory. Id. at 2583.
53. Yd. at 2581. FATCO was organized under the Apache Tribe's Constitution and with
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior to manage the timber harvesting process for the
Apache. Id. FATCO operates exclusively on the reservation and was created with federal
funding. Id.
54. Id. at 2582. The Apache entered into an agreement to repay Pinetop any taxes
associated with its reservation operations. Id. The motor carrier license tax was 2.5% of
Pinet'op's gross receipts. Id. at 2581. The use fuel tax was eight cents per gallon of fuel used
by Pinetop on state highways throughout the reservation. Id. at 2581-82.
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may be preempted by federal law even when Congress has not
spoken on the subject. 55 In such a case, the Court would make a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal
interests at stake to determine whether the state tax would violate
federal law. 56 The Court found the federal regulations of Indian
harvesting of timber to be so complete in this case as to preclude
the taxes imposed by the state. 57 The Court also found that the
taxes would prevent the profits of the timber sales from benefiting
the Apache, would undermine the Secretary of the Interior's
authority to establish rates and prices associated with the timber
sales, and would detrimentally impact the Apache's ability to meet
the sustained-yield requirements of federal law.58 The Court further
determined that the only state interest at stake was the general
interest in raising revenue. 59 As a result, the Court held that the
state taxes were preempted by federal law.6°
Only five years later, the Supreme Court faced a similar issue
regarding the permissibility of state taxation on the Indian tribes
themselves. 61 In Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, the Court
considered the question of whether the State of Montana could tax
the Blackfeet Tribe's ("Blackfeet") royalty interests under oil and
gas leases with non-Indian lessees under the IMLA of 1938.62 The
non-Indian lessees paid the taxes to the state and then deducted
the amount of the taxes paid from the royalties owed to the
Blackfeet.6 The Blackfeet brought suit in federal court seeking
55. Id. at 2587. In addition, state taxation authority may interfere with the right of
reservation tribes to enact and be governed by their own laws. Id. at 2583.
56. Id. at 2584. The Court also stated that it would review the language of the relevant
statutes and treaties in reference to the tradition of tribal sovereignty. Id.
57. Id. at 2586. The Secretary of the Interior has promulgated an extensive set of
regulations governing sales, advertising, bidding, contracts, permits, fire protection, and
many other aspects of the timber harvesting business on tribal reservations. Id. at 2585.
58. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 100 S.Ct. at 2586-87. Because the Federal
Government drafted and approved the Apache's coal contracts to produce revenues based on
the Apache's business expenses, the imposition of the state taxes would skew the Apache's
expenses, revenues, and contracts so as to no longer comply with the requirements of
federal law. Id. The state taxes would also interfere with the Apache's ability to pay for the
federally funded programs providing fire control, safety inspection, and wildlife preservation
services. Id. at 2587.
59. Id. at 2587. The Court found no evidence of a compensatory purpose for the state
taxes. Id.
60. Id. at 2588. Here the economic burden would fall solely on the Apache. Id.
61. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. 2399 (1985).
62. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. at 2401. The IMLA of 1938 neither contained a
section specifically allowing state taxation as had the Indian Mining Leasing Act of 1924
("IMLA of 1924") nor expressly repealed the IMLA of 1924 tax. Id. at 2402.
63. Id. at 2401. The taxes included an oil and gas severance tax, oil and gas gross
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declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the state
tax, alleging that the IMLA of 1938 did not give the state authority
to tax Blackfeet's royalty interest and that the tax was unlawful.6
The Blackfeet Tribe Court noted that the general rule is that
Indian tribes, themselves, are exempt from state taxation within
their own territory, but Congress can authorize state taxes on
Indian Tribes under the Indian Commerce Clause.6 The Court
stated it would not lift the Indian exemption from taxation unless
Congress, itself had, or through its legislation, manifested its intent
to subject the Indians to state taxation.6 6 In addition, the Court held
that statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the tribes,
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit. 6 The Court
then examined the text and legislative history of the IMLA of 1938
and found no explicit grant of state taxation authority.68 Moreover,
the Court found that the IMLA of 1938 did not impliedly
incorporate the provision of the Indian Mining Leasing Act of 1924
69
("IMLA of 1924"), which had expressly authorized state taxation.
Accordingly, the Court held that the state may not tax Indian
royalty income from leases issued under the IMLA of 1938, absent a
clear congressional consent to taxation, even when the tax in
question was imposed on a non-Indian lessee. 0
Just four years after Blackfeet Tribe, the Court encountered a
case that was seemingly identical to White Mountain Apache
Tribe.7' In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court
proceeds tax, oil and gas conservation tax, and a resource indemnity trust tax. Id. at 2401
n.1.
64. Id. at 2401. The IMLA of 1924 had explicitly authorized state taxes on Indian tribes
and individuals. Id. at 2403.
65. Id. at 2402-03 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The Indian Commerce Clause
empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. However, the Court noted that Congress has rarely authorized state taxes on Indians.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. at 2402.
66. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. at 2403. The IMLA of 1924 contained a specific
authorization of state taxation, and the IMLA of 1938 was silent on the issue. Id.
67. Id. at 2403. This canon of construction is considered deeply rooted in the "unique
trust relationship" between the United States and the Indians. Id.
68. Id. at 2403-04; See 25 U.S.C. §§ 396b-396g. The IMLA of 1938 was silent as to the
permissibility of state taxation of the production of minerals on Indian lands. Id.
69. Id. at 2404; See 25 U.S.C. § 398. The IMLA of 1924 had provided "[t]hat the
production of oil and gas and other minerals on such lands may be taxed by the State in
which said lands are located .in all respects the same as production on unrestricted lands
. . . " Id. The Court commented that the legislative history of the IMLA of 1938 implied that
Congress intended to replace the IMLA of 1924, not incorporate it into the IMLA of 1938. Id.
70. Id. The Court has previously held that, although tax immunity is generally narrowly
construed, the opposite is true in the case of the Indians. Id. at 2403.
71. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 109 S.Ct. 1698 (1989).
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considered whether New Mexico's severance taxes on non-Indian
lessee's oil and gas production from tribal reservation property
were preempted by federal law.7 2 In 1976, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
("Jicarilla"), under the IMLA of 1938, enacted a severance tax on
any oil and gas removed from Jicarilla lands. 73 The Jicarilla entered
into five leases with Cotton Petroleum, a non-Indian company that
extracts oil and gas, for a portion of the Jicarilla reservation. 74 In
addition to paying the Jicarilla taxes, between 1976 and 1982,
Cotton Petroleum paid, without objection, five separate oil and gas
taxes to the state.75 In 1982, Cotton Petroleum paid its taxes under
protest and brought an action in federal court asserting that the
state taxes violated the Indian Commerce, Interstate Commerce,
Due Process, and Supremacy Clauses of the United States
Constitution. 76 Cotton Petroleum alleged that the state taxes were
not related to state expenditures in providing services to oil and
77
gas producers.
The Cotton Petroleum Court noted that the tax immunity of the
United States includes an Indian Tribe for whom the United States
holds land in trust.78 However, the Court declined to apply the
well-established rule that no state taxation of commercial activity
on Indian reservations may occur absent a clear congressional
intent to the contrary.79 The Court determined that a state could
subject a non-Indian lessee of the Jicarilla to a nondiscriminatory
72. Id. at 1701. In a previous action, the Court held that the Jicarilla had the authority
to tax oil and gas produced by its non-Indian lessees on its reservation. Id. at 1702.
73. Id. at 1703. The Secretary of the Interior approved the tax as required by law. Id.
74. Id. The leases provide for payment by Cotton Petroleum to the Jicarilla of rental
payments and royalties on its oil and gas production. Id.
75. Id. at 1703-04. Cotton Petroleum paid taxes amounting to eight percent of the
production value to the state and six percent of the production value to the Jicarilla Id.
76. Cotton Petroleum, 109 S.Ct. at 1704; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CO NST. art. VI, cl.2. Cotton Petroleum did not allege that the state
taxes imposed a burden on the Jicarilla. Id. Cotton Petroleum relied on a footnote in a 1982
United States Supreme Court decision, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S.Ct. 894, 912,
n.26 (1982), indicating that the dormant Commerce Clause might be implicated by a state tax
on Indian activity imposed to an extent beyond which its contacts with the activity justified,
and when the activity is already being taxed by the appropriate Indian Tribe. Merrion, 102
S.Ct. at 912, n.26. (holding that a Tribe severance tax imposed upon non-Indian lessees'
mineral production on the Indian reservation did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause
despite a New Mexico state tax assessed on the same production). Merrion, at 912-13.
77. Id. Initially, the Jicarilla was not a party to the action. But later, the Jicarilla filed a
brief amicus curiae in which it argued the state tax would interfere with its taxing plans. Id.
78. Id. at 1710.
79. Id. As a result of the Court's non-application of the bright-line Indian exemption
from state taxation, a non-Indian lessee's oil production would not be "automatically exempt"
from state taxation. Id.
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tax despite the fact that the financial burden of the tax fell on the
Jicarilla.8° After finding that tribe lessees were not automatically
exempt from state taxation, the Court held that, under the
circumstances of the case, federal law did not preempt the state's
severance taxes on the oil and gas produced on the tribal
reservation by the non-Indian lessees.8' In so holding, the Court
distinguished its decision in Crow H on the basis that, in the case
at issue, unlike in Crow II, the taxes were not so extraordinarily
high as to impose a substantial burden on the tribe nor did they
have a demonstrated negative effect on the marketability of
production from tribe property.8 2
Although the Supreme Court had lessened the deference given to
Indian sovereignty from state taxation over the years, the Court
had consistently adhered to the general principle that nontaxpayers may not sue for refunds of taxes paid by others.8 In
United States v. California, the Supreme Court considered the
question of whether the federal government may recover taxes that
it claimed were unlawfully assessed against its private contractor
by the state of California.8 The United States engaged private
contractor Williams Brothers Engineering Co. ("WBEC") to manage
its oil drilling operations at a reserve in California-85 California
subsequently assessed sales and use taxes against WBEC, and
WBEC unsuccessfully appealed to the board of equalization.8
WBEC then paid the taxes under protest with funds provided by
the federal government. 87 WBEC timely appealed to state court,
seeking a fourteen million dollar refund and later entered into an
agreement with the state for a three million dollar refund and
dismissal of the actions without prejudice.8 The United States
80. Id. The Court noted that the IMLA of 1938, unlike the IMLA of 1924, did not
specifically authorize or prohibit state taxation. Id. at 1712.
81. Cotton Petroleum, 109 S.Ct. at 1719.
82. Id. at 1713; See also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 100 S.Ct. at 2578 (holding that
Montana's severance and gross proceeds taxes could not lawfully be imposed on non-Indian
lessee's mining coal on Tribe property).
83. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1659.
84. United States v. Caliornia,113 S.Ct. 1784, 1786 (1993). There was no claim that
the state tax was itself unconstitutional. Id.
85. Id. Between 1975 and 1985, WBEC operated the oil drilling reserve for the federal
government. Id.
86. Id. WBEC was assessed $14 million in taxes by the state of California. WBEC had
claimed that the state was attempting to tax federal government property outside the scope
of its authority, but the board of equalization interpreted the applicable state law to include
the government operations managed by WBEC. Id.
87. Id. The federal government clearly bore the burden of the tax. Id. at 1788.
88. Id. WBEC received the $3 million refund for assessments on property bought by
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subsequently filed suit in federal court seeking declaratory
judgment relief, alleging that the taxed property was exempt and
that WBEC had been wrongfully classified and taxed under state
law.8 9 The United States also sought a refund of the outstanding
eleven million dollars, plus interest, under the federal common law
action of assumpsit for money had and received. °
The California Court explained that tax immunity is appropriate
only when the levy falls on the United States, itself, or on an
agency so closely connected as to be virtually identical with the
United States.9 1 The Court then found that the United States could
not assert its immunity from state taxation against taxes owed by
WBEC merely because the federal government absorbed the
economic burden.9 2 Moreover, the Court determined that the
federal common law action of assumpsit for money had and
received is based on the existence of an implied contract and that
there was no such contract between California and the United
States.9 3 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the taxpayer,
WBEC, had already accepted a settlement in regard to the taxes
and, thus, was precluded from bringing an action for refund.94
Accordingly, the government, as subrogee of WBEC's rights, could
not bring the action of assumpsit to assert a nonexistent right. 95 As
a result, the Court held that the federal government was not
entitled to receive a refund for state taxes paid by its pricate
96
contractor, despite its reimbursement for said taxes.
In Valley County v. Thomas, the Supreme Court of Montana
considered a similar issue involving the appropriateness of a tax
W1BEC and installed by government employees. Id.
89. United States v. California, 113 S.Ct. at 1786.
90. Id. The outstanding $11 million consisted of assessments on property bought by
WBEC and installed by WBEC-managed private subcontractors. Id.
91. Id. at 1789. The federal government is not immune from indirect state taxation or
from taxes that have an effect upon it. Id. at 1788.
92. Id. The Court stated that the government is prohibited from using its obligation to
indemnify WBEC for taxes paid to create a cause of action for assumpsit. Id. In addition, the
Court concluded that although the government had contracted to reimburse WBEC for state
taxes, the resulting payment of state taxes by the government did not amount to an
impermissible state tax on the federal government. Id.
93. Id. at 1790. California and WBEC had the relationship of creditor and debtor, a
relationship to which the federal government was not a party. Id.
94. United States v. California, 113 S.Ct. at 1788. WBEC had dismissed its cases
without prejudice, which terminated the action and ended the parties' rights. Id. at 1790.
95. Id. In addition, the statute of linitations had run on the action. Id. at 1791.
96. Id. at 1792. Even the federal government is not entitled to an action of assumpsit
merely because it "shoulders the entire economic burden of the levy" when the tax is
assessed against its contractor. Id.
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refund to a non-taxpayer when it determined whether, under
Montana law, a county that had unlawfully collected vehicle license
fees from vehicle owners could be required to turn over such fees
to the proper taxing authority.97 The Montana law at issue required
each county to license motor vehicles and collect license fees from
vehicle owners based on the county in which the vehicle owner
resided.98 Valley County sued McCone County for injunctive and
monetary relief, alleging that McCone taxable in Valley County. 9
The Valley County Court considered the lack of privity between the
two counties, as well as the lack of a statutory duty providing for a
refund, but found inequitable the suggested remedy that the proper
authority simply tax the vehicle owner a second time; this solution
would, in effect, force the vehicle owner to sue the improper taxing
authority for a refund. 1°° Instead, the Court held that the proper
taxing authority could recover the unlawfully collected license fees
directly from the improper taxing authority that had collected the
fees and not from the vehicle owner who innocently paid the
10 1
wrong party.
Historically, the Supreme Court seemed reluctant to allow state
taxation of non-Indian lessees for their production or use of tribal
resources when Congress had remained silent on the issue of
whether such taxes were permitted. °2 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has continued to give considerable deference to tribal
sovereignty by disallowing state taxation on Indian tribes,
themselves, absent an unmistakable Congressional intent to do
otherwise. 3 However, following the Crow II and Cotton Petroleum
decisions, it was less than clear whether a state could properly tax
a non-Indian lessee on its production or use of tribal resources,
and, if so, what limitation was placed on the state's ability to do so.
In Crow II, the United States Supreme Court summarily affirmed
the Ninth Circuit's holding that Montana's taxation of a non-Indian
97. 97 P.2d 345 (Mont: 1939).
98. Valley County, 97 P.2d at 365. Under the Montana state system, only one county
could properly tax the owner of each motor vehicle. Id. at 349.
99. Id. at 348.
100. Id. at 366. Montana law provides for suits between counties as well as monetary
awards against counties. Id.
101. Id. The Court specifically ruled so as to minimize the burden imposed on citizens.
Id.
102. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 100 S.Ct. at 2588. The Supreme Court had
previously employed a long-standing tradition of deference to the sovereignty of tribal
self-government. Id. at 2587.
103. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 105 S.Ct. at 2404. This case involved a state attempt to
tax an Indian tribe directly, not through a lessee. Id. at 2401.
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mineral lessee was both federally preempted and void as in
contravention of tribal self-government. 01° Because the Supreme
Court did not write an opinion in Crow II, it appeared from the
summary affirmance that states were federally preempted from
taxing non-Indian lessees on their production of Tribal resources.
Believing it was owed a refund for these improperly assessed taxes,
the Tribe filed its action seeking restitution for the taxes paid by its

mineral lessee (Crow v).105
Before the restitution issue *as decided, the United States
10 6
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Cotton Petroleum.
On its face, Cotton Petroleum's holding that a non-Indian mineral
lessee could be subject to state taxation for its production of tribal
resources appeared to directly contradict the holding of Crow II.
However, in Cotton Petroleum, the Court (in a footnote)
distinguished Crow II on the basis that the Crow II taxes were so
10 7
high as to be discriminatory and impermissible.
The Court's opinion in Crow IV explained in greater detail the
basis for distinguishing Crow II from Cotton Petroleum.
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that each of the two
sovereigns, the state and the Tribe, had taxing jurisdiction over all
on-reservation production. 0 8 Moreover, the Court stated that
Montana had the power to tax Tribe coal but could not do so at
the exorbitantly high and discriminatory rate it assessed. 1°9
Accordingly, the Crow IV decision both continued the Supreme
Court's trend of finding no automatic preemption of state taxes on
the production of tribal resources by non-Indian lessees and
clarified that any such state tax may not be so high as to be
discriminatory. In addition, in Crow IV the Supreme Court followed
the traditional principle that a non-taxpayer may not generally sue
104. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 92 F3d 826 (9th Cir. 1996)(per curiam), aff'd,
108 S.Ct. 685 (1988). The Ninth Circuit had determined that the fact that the Tribe was not
the taxpayer did not preclude the Tibe from recovering. Crow Tribe of Indians, 92 F.3d 826,
828 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
105. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1656. The Tribe claimed that the coal being
taxed was a resource of the Tribe and that the taxed interfered with tribal sovereignty. Id. at
1657.
106. Cotton Petroleum, 109 S.Ct. at 1698. The Court held that federal law did not
preempt state taxation of a non-Indian lessee's production of Tribal minerals. Id. at 1713.
107. Id. at 1723. The Court stated that the Montana taxes were invalid because they
were so excessively high, and not because the state lacked authority to impose the taxes. Id.
108. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1660. Both the district court and the United
State Supreme Court noted that the Montana did provide public services to the non-Indian
lessees and the other occupants of the cede strip. Id. at 1657.
109. Id. The district court commented that the state could permissibly enact a
"reasonably sized" tax upon the coal production. Id. at 1658.
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for a refund of taxes paid by another. 10 Despite having found the
state taxes upon Crow production to be discriminatory and
impermissible, the Supreme Court held that the Tribe was not
entitled to disgorgement of taxes paid by its mineral lessee."1
Consistent with its ruling in California,the Supreme Court found
that when the taxpayer, itself, had settled or waived its claim for a
refund, a non-taxpayer could not assert a right to restitution for the
taxes paid, even if the economic burden of the tax fell on the
non-taxpayer. In addition, the Supreme Court distinguished Crow IV
from the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Valley County on
the basis that Valley County involved two taxing jurisdictions of
which only one had legal authority to tax.11 2 In such a case, the
Montana Supreme Court held that restitution by the improperly
3
taxing authority to the proper authority was appropriate."1
However, in Crow IV, because both the Tribe and the state were
proper taxing authorities, the United States Supreme Court found
14
the tax disgorgement remedy sought to be inequitable.'
The Crow IV decision leaves open one important question,
namely the extent, if any, to which the Tribe is owed restitution by
the state. Although the Supreme Court held that total disgorgement
of the state taxes paid by the mineral lessee was inappropriate, the
Court remanded for a determination of the amount of restitution
the Tribe may be owed as a result of the excessive nature of the5
taxes improperly assessed by the state and paid by the lessee."
The Court ordered that this restitution question be considered in
light of the distribution of approximately twenty million dollars the
Crow Tribe has already received from the district court registry in
this action.1 6 The dissent apparently fears that this consideration
110. Id. at 1659. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit had found relatively unimportant the fact
that Westmoreland, and not the Tribe, had paid the taxes. Id.
111. Id. at 1662. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the total disgorgement of
state taxes requested by the Tribe was inappropriate. Id.
112. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct at 1661; See Valley County v. Thomas, 97 P.2d 345
(Mont. 1939). In Valley County, two competing counties were attempting to tax the same
vehicles, which, under state statute, could only be taxed by the county in which the vehicle
owner maintained a residence. Id.
113. Valley County, 97 P.2d at 366. The Montana Supreme Court found that the
improper taxing authority had been unjustly enriched at the expense of the proper taxing
authority. Id.
114. Crow Tribe of Indians, 118 S.Ct. at 1661. Unlike the holding in Valley County, the
United States Supreme Court held that the state of Montana had not been uajustly enriched
at the expense of the Tribe. Id.
115. Id. at 1662. The Court noted that all severance and gross proceeds taxes belonged
to the state as of January, 1983, and November, 1987, respectively. Id.
116. Id. The Court stated that the amount of taxes to be kept by Montana or returned
to the Tribe should be "assessed in light of the court-ordered distribution of all funds in the
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may lead to a hasty conclusion that the Tribe should not receive
any restitution because it has already received many millions of
dollars. Restitution is generally required to be made by one party to
another when the first party has been unjustly enriched at the
expense
of the second party."'
Furthermore,
equitable
considerations render restitution as appropriate remedy in
instances in which it is necessary to restore an injured party to his
or her original pre-injury position.118 On the basis of these common
law principles of restitution, it would, indeed, seem that the
restitution should be awarded solely on the basis of the
excessiveness of the state taxes as determined on remand and the
resultant unjust enrichment, if any, rather than on an attempt to
equalize benefits between the Tribe and state. However, until this
restitution issue is decided on remand and upheld on appeal, if
applicable, several questions remain unclear. First, the permissible
extent to which a state may tax a non-Indian lessee's production of
tribal resources remains to be determined. Second, the amount of
restitution appropriately awarded to a non-taxpayer tribe in the
case of an impermissibly high state tax has not yet been resolved.
Third, and perhaps most important, it is unsettled whether a
non-taxpayer tribe may be precluded from receiving any restitution
from a state on the basis of unjust enrichment, even when the state
tax is impermissible. Particularly because the Supreme Court in
Crow IV injected the requirement that the district court consider
past money received in its determination of the restitution award, it
is impossible to predict how these questions will be answered by
the district court and, ultimately, perhaps, by the United States
Supreme Court. As a result, until these questions are answered,
non-taxpayer tribes that shoulder the economic burden of taxes
and wish to challenge the legitimacy of those taxes would be
well-advised to direct their lessees to pay their taxes under protest
and to refuse to waive any right to a refund. Otherwise, in the
absence of a Supreme Court decision to the contrary, even when a
tax is found to be excessive, discriminatory, and impermissible, the
non-taxpayer tribe may be precluded from receiving a refund for
taxes improperly paid by its lessee.
Martha A. Fodor

registry to the United States, as trustee for the Tribe." Id.
117. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
118. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 910 (6th ed. 1991).

